Sunday, October 16, 2016

Précis of Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen

The Encomium of Helen, as we understand it today, is a speech performed by the Sicilian sophist, Gorgias.  It acts as an op-ed in The Philosophy Times, so to speak, as it contrasts the Platonic stronghold of the Greek philosophia, the love of wisdom, and in turn interjects with a not-so-serious style, demonstrating the possible contradiction of mainstream discourse through persuasion, a style we might know today as rhetoric.  Gorgias assumes the position of the inherently attractive Helen of Troy, who in mythology is the cause of the Trojan War.  In her defense, Gorgias shows the audience that she is not to blame, whether she was persuaded by the gods, by physical force, by love, or by speech—all which conveniently serve as possibilities for Gorgias to expose the fallacies of mainstream philosophy and subsequently delineate the significance of persuasion and rhetoric itself.  Passages twelve through fifteen specifically serve as a bridging point for Gorgias’ assertion of connectivity between love, persuasion and the hands of time.  This feat is disturbing to the core public figures of Greek philosophy, because it renders the ‘love’ of wisdom as possibly insincere.
The possibility that Helen was ‘constrained by means of discourse’ is raised by Gorgias in section twelve.  Not just physical assault, but force of persuasive language upon her is enough to justify her innocence, as she may have been a victim of such deception via the ‘mind of Persuasion’—which isn’t specifically defined in the text, but as it is, serves as a reminder of the eclipsing power of (big P) Persuasion, which doesn’t seem to have a human origin, making it even more capable of overriding Helen’s capacities to object.  When it comes to finger pointing however, Gorgias does declare that, ‘he who persuaded’ Helen did wrong, while Helen ‘is wrongly blamed’.  So, according to Gorgias, although the strength of persuasion does hold Helen in unjustifiable positions, the opportunity for blaming does exist, but these situations require a reassessment of power structures and the uncovering of lesser-known factors at play, which may have persuaded he who persuaded Helen. 
Gorgias continues to elaborate on several examples of the hidden strengths of persuasion in discourse, starting in section thirteen, first being of astronomers ‘who by setting aside one opinion and building up another in its stead make incredible and obscure things apparent to the eyes of opinion.’  Here Gorgias begins to introduce the concept of sight, but interestingly he also introduces the concepts of time and paradigm.  Astronomy does rely on the disproval of facts and the new discoveries which replace them, but these are not the fate or cause of man alone, but of the human senses and the unpredictability of nature in the sequence of time and context of space.  Furthermore, Gorgias validates the strength of persuasion by juxtaposing it with wisdom of the most distanced kind— the cosmos, the ornaments of earth.  This could also be viewed as one way Gorgias is universalizing the concept of ‘otherness’ or the ‘unknown’— mainstays of the negative portrayal of sophists by philosophers.  Second, he speaks of ‘necessary debates’ that are ‘artfully written but not truthfully meant’ which please and convince many.  This is arguably Gorgias’ stab at the status quo of philosophy, mainstream opinion, or otherwise the public figures who choose to assert mastery over the uneducated general population with amusing content lacking substantial inquiry, for reasons unclear, except maybe that the masses enjoy being proved right of matters already known, building trust in the administrator of stagnant ‘wisdom’ and reinforcing resistance to change and marginal opinions.
Yet again Gorgias continues to defend and compare ‘the power of discourse’ to another respected discipline, pharmacopoeia.  In section fourteen he explains how both discourses and drugs can have effects on the body and soul, ranging from death to delight.  This is a critical piece of the Encomium of Helen, in terms of universalizing persuasion into empathetic resonance, because he is now pairing physiology in sequence following the previously mentioned astronomy, two parts which easily add to a wholeness of the individual and collective and deemphasize the ‘other’.  Considering Helen was supposedly the cause of the Trojan War, Gorgias’ rejection of this narrative creates space for the audience to consider the denial of those who blame Helen for the horrors of war instead of owning up to it themselves and acknowledging their powerlessness as victims of discourse. 
Gorgias points out in section fifteen that, ‘it has been said’— which is interesting because he is not owning up to this statement— that if Helen was ‘persuaded by discourse, she did no wrong but rather was unfortunate.’  Considering that to be fortunate or misfortunate can be explicated as a state which relies upon chance and time, Gorgias is continuing to leave a breadcrumb trail for us to see our logical relation to time and space.  First introduced in section thirteen, Gorgias incorporates the sense of sight into his argument again also, when he prompts that if love was the culprit of Helen’s alleged sin, she is still not to blame because ‘the soul receives an impression on its own ways through the sight.’  Here is another example of how Gorgias is complicating the meaning of love for philosophers, because if we cannot know exactly how the soul comprehends our sight and we also cannot predict the future, we are victims to the unknown nature of the true relationship between our own physiology, other people and the world— which again, relies on time and space to even begin to comprehend.
Returning to his comparison in section fourteen of pharmacopoeia to discourse and the polarized results of each (‘some give pain, others delight, others terrify, others rouse the hearers to courage, and yet others by a certain vile persuasion drug and trick the soul’), Gorgias continues to allude to persuasion as a precursor and cohort of war, that which Helen is wrongfully blamed.  Gorgias returns to the sense of sight to portray the battlefield realistically— it is not a fantastical or glorified account of war.  He describes how hostile armored bodies of war are ‘often panic-stricken men [who] flee future danger <as if it were> present’ after beholding visuals of brutality.  Essentially he is describing post-traumatic stress disorder, which again circles back to his position on discourse being like pharmacopoeia— it affects the soul and body in ways via the senses that we do not fully comprehend; therefore, discourse can only be trusted in the sense that it can’t be trusted, even in times of fear or love.  These sections in total are part of what is arguably a central theme in the Encomium of Helen: that discourse is not that serious; it is not possible without persuasion, which reaches beyond what is known to be called wisdom.

Wednesday, October 12, 2016

A Rhetorical Precis on the Apology ( Oracle of Delphi)

Jorge Rico Vera
Rhetoric 103A
October 11, 2016
GSI: Jerilyn Sambrooke

A Rhetorical Precis On Plato’s, Apology

In the Apology there is a section in which Socrates uses the oracle of Delphi to explain to his audience, those who have put him on trial, that he in fact is the wisest of men in society. Being the wisest of men in society, means that he knows what is true and virtuous, therefore, he is not to be guilty of such accusations that have been brought up against him. In the accusations, the strongest one of them all is that he is teaching the “youth” fallacies and is deceiving them from the truth. Socrates understands that he is doing the whole complete opposite, for he knows that he is a virtuous man and speaks nothing but the truth.
The oracle of Delphi is used as a reference when Socrates states, “what can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men?”. He tries to understand what god means by such statement since Socrates himself considers to have no wisdom, therefore there must be a man wiser than himself, concluding that the oracle is a fallacy, but the dilemma is that god would not make such a strong statement because it would be against his nature. Essentially the oracle of Delphi is setting up the foundation in which Socrates will actually use to anger even more, those who have put him on trial, giving them another reason to sentence him to death.
            Socrates develops a plan to prove to himself and to god, that there are wiser men in society, he does so by first going up to a politician who was considered to have wisdom and thinks of himself of knowing and understanding such knowledge. Yet, when Socrates goes up to him and starts an intellectual conversation, he is already coming to the conclusion in his head that this politician whose name is not mentioned, is not wise at all, rather he is far from acquiring such a “beautiful” thing. It is during this first examination that Socrates states, “he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither now or think that I know”. The argument is that Socrates understands and acknowledges that he, himself knows nothing, as compare to the politician who thinks of himself to know wisdom, is worse off since he is ignorant of who he is and of what he thinks he knows. In the same way, the politician represents all those who have put him on trial, and they are the one’s actually listening to Socrates as he is delivering the message. In doing such an action, Socrates is defying their authority at their own home by stating that they are the ones that are wrong since they know nothing of what is virtuous and true. Socrates knows that the oracle is actually infuriating them all, instead of creating empathy towards him during his own trial. This is purposely done because Socrates is not trying to generate this empathy feeling, but is speaking what he knows best, and that is the truth.
            The politician does not only represent those who practice politics, but also poets, philosophers and anyone who practices a kind of art that he thinks understands and knows. Socrates is essentially putting powerful figures in Athenian society on trial, for they are the ones to be judged for not knowing that they know nothing of, yet make money and teach their art. Socrates asserts himself to be an indispensable philosopher, that is the wisest men of them all, and such argument is reinforced with the oracle of Delphi. He was able to influence me that he actually is innocent, and that in fact the politicians should be the ones on trial. Yet, the audience in which the context is written, is pulled towards the side that Socrates should be sentenced to death for all the “evil” he has asserted onto Athenian society. The argument that Socrates makes is that he will not use his argumentative skills to persuade his audience into condemning him innocent. He instead uses the oracle to show who should actually be on trial and reinforces the fact that he is the wisest amongst men. The hostility that came by embarrassment from the politicians towards Socrates, is caused by his ability to stay true and virtuous throughout the entire trial. This outcome leads to the final sentencing of death, for Socrates.

Posted for Caroline Kerr

Apology, by Plato

Plato’s text, “Apology” (399 BC), presents the reader with the scene of Socrates trial where the court asserts Socrates of two accusations, (1) Socrates corrupts the youth and (2), Socrates does not believe in the Gods of the city. Despite the current understanding of the term apology, throughout the text Socrates does not reflect, regret, nor sympathize with the court regarding these accusations. The purpose of Plato’s text, Apology is to demonstrate how Socrates accepts his punishments even when he was martyred by the court in hope/order to bring everlasting enlightenment and clarity to the people of Athens, this becomes more apparent when Socrates’ Comments on his Sentence when the jury condemns him to death. Plato portrays Socrates as a hero until he dies, which reflects upon how Socrates does in fact accept his fate no matter how unjust it may be, as demonstrated by the passage Socrates' Comments on his Sentence.

One of the largest charges Socrates is accused of is corrupting the morals of the youth. The Court states, “But far more dangerous are these, who began when you were children,” When children are young, it is easy to shape their minds and allow them to take on certain believes. When Socrates tells the youth to question what is around them the people of Athens see this as tainting the youth. The purpose of this was that Socrates was attempting to undo the ‘falsehood’ in which teachers, and higher powers have embedded within children at such a young age thatthey began to take over children's thoughts. Socrates is described as, “ evil doer, and a curious person” making it seem as if all people who are curious are also evil doers. Instead of rejecting these claims, Socrates professes why he thinks it is right to change the thoughts of children so they can see clearly of what is happening around them because it is better to see evil than to see falsehoods around you. Falsehoods are taught to make beliefs seem pure, but when one uncovers the true meaning of something they have the opportunity to see the evil. According to Plato, Socrates states that those, “who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause; and he teachers the afore said doctrines to other.” As demonstrated, it continues to discuss how he looks under the earth etc, meaning something which seems so grounded he is able to unveil something that was never meant to be found but is the foundation/root to ones thought process.

Socrates addresses his undeniable accusations when he is sentenced to death where his final words are spoken. Socrates believes that even when he dies he will continue to philosophize about everything, and that killing him will not silence him because his theories have already been exposed. Alongside with this, Socrates tells his accusers that even though they are managing to silence him so they can live free of his criticism, people who have been silenced will begin to rise to ‘replace’ Socrates and criticize them as well — showing that there is no such thing as silence. Socrates’ final words state, “... if you think by killing men you can avoid the accuser censuring your lives, you are mistaken”, this allows the thought of how even once he is killed that there court will not stop censoring the peoples thoughts to arise and how they will always find a way to silence the people. Socrates makes sure that when he is martyred that the court treats him as if he was a common man, even though he was an extremely wise man, because in the court he knew nothing so he would speak in common terms and just speak the truth. Socrates’ believes that even though he is dying he will find everlasting enlightenment with the Gods because for his entire life he lived honestly.

As shown, Plato portrays Socrates as a hero until he dies, which reflects upon how Socrates does in fact accept his fate no matter how unjust it may be, as demonstrated by the passage Socrates' Comments on his Sentence.

Hecuba by Euripedes: Odysseus' Persuasive Spectacle

Calvin Leung
Rhetoric 103A
GSI: Jerilyn Sambrooke
8 October 2016
Rhetoric 103A Precis
Hecuba by Euripides: Odysseus’ Persuasive Spectacle
Euripides’ Hecuba is a spectacle of sorrow, a three-part Agon on Hecuba’s continual suffering over the sacrifice of her daughter Polyxena.  Upon Odysseus’ arrival to send Polynexa to her death in the first Agon, it is interesting to note his lengthy argument in persuading Hecuba not to mourn the loss of her daughter as a sacrifice to Achilles’ death.  Odysseus contends that Hecuba should accept her daughter as a sacrifice via three assertions: 1) in Hecuba’s place, Odysseus would give his daughter as a sacrifice if ordered to, 2) Achilles’ wishes should be treated honorably in death since we would respect his wishes honorably if alive, and 3) there are many old men and widows who are just as sorrowful as Hecuba over the consequences of the Trojan war.
By stating “what I said to all, I will not now deny, that after Troy’s capture, I would give thy daughter to the chiefest of our host because he asked a victim,” Odysseus’ first assertion implores Hecuba to willingly hand her daughter over because he would do the same.  Beginning with “what I said to all, I will not now deny,” Odysseus demonstrates his words are not idle to Hecuba—his words and deeds are imparted to all unequivocally.  In doing so, Odysseus attempts to exude ethos and build commonalities between him and Hecuba.     
Odysseus’ second assertion fortifies the status quo that honoring wishes should also be unequivocally recognized and executed—and should be applied even to the deceased.  His next phrase “now Achilles, [Hecuba], deserves honour at our hands, since for Hellas he died as nobly as a mortal can.  Is not this a foul reproach to treat a man as a friend in life, but, when he is gone from us, to treat him so no more?  By beginning with Achilles deserving honour at “our hands,” Odysseus makes the sacrifice an intimate process involving more than just Hecuba and Polyxena.  Odysseus too is indebted in honoring Achilles.  Furthermore, by implementing a rhetorical question regarding honoring the treatment of the dead in comparison to the treatment of the living, Odysseus begs Hecuba to realize that the answer is obvious.  Both should be treated equally.  Rather than asking Hecuba, Odysseus attempts to make Hecuba persuade herself, encouraging her to second-guess her own grief.   
Lastly, Odysseus’ third assertion is an attempt to put things in perspective for Hecuba.  Upon hearing her grievances, Odysseus contests that countless others, from old men to grieving widows, suffer just as much as her following the Trojan war.  Subsequently, Odysseus states: “endure these sorrows; for us, if we are wrong in resolving to honour the brave, we shall bring up ourselves a charge of ignorance; but… regard not your friends as such and pay no homage to your gallant dead, that Hellas may prosper and ye may reap the fruits of such policy.”  Here, Odysseus illustrates the repercussions of sacrifice.  Negating the implications of sorrow, as it is shared amongst everyone in the war, Odysseus claims that if the sacrifice ended up being “wrong” and needless, then they would merely admit ignorance.  On the other hand, by paying homage to the dead, Greece and its citizens via the sacrifice may harvest newfound prosperity.  To Odysseus, the net gains mathematically overweigh the net loss when considering who is affected.  By using the pronouns “we” and “us” when talking about the possibility of being incorrect, Odysseus constrains the fault of mistake to himself and his close associates.  On the contrary, by utilizing the term “Hellas” when transitioning into positive repercussions, Hecuba is encouraged to realize that the loss of one can impact thousands of others.  Whether or not it is a product of the translation, it is interesting to note that Odysseus chooses to use the specific term “Hellas” to identify Greece.  Closely resembling Helen, the term “Hellas” feminizes the city-state, eluding “the reap the fruits” to fertility—even birthing.  In gendering Greece, Odysseus suggests to Hecuba that Polynexa’s sacrifice will result in a feminine rebirth for countless others.  As such, Hecuba would “give birth” to prosperity for all of Hellas.

Tuesday, October 11, 2016

Aristote from the Poetics and from the Topics

Aristotle, from the Poetics
Part XX
Language in general includes the following parts: Letter, Syllable, Connecting Word, Noun, Verb, Inflection or Case, Sentence or Phrase.
A Letter is an indivisible sound, yet not every such sound, but only one which can form part of a group of sounds. For even brutes utter indivisible sounds, none of which I call a letter. The sound I mean may be either a vowel, a semivowel, or a mute. A vowel is that which without impact of tongue or lip has an audible sound. A semivowel that which with such impact has an audible sound, as S and R. A mute, that which with such impact has by itself no sound, but joined to a vowel sound becomes audible, as G and D. These are distinguished according to the form assumed by the mouth and the place where they are produced; according as they are aspirated or smooth, long or short; as they are acute, grave, or of an intermediate tone; which inquiry belongs in detail to the writers on meter.
A Syllable is a nonsignificant sound, composed of a mute and a vowel: for GR without A is a syllable, as also with A- GRA. But the investigation of these differences belongs also to metrical science.
A Connecting Word is a nonsignificant sound, which neither causes nor hinders the union of many sounds into one significant sound; it may be placed at either end or in the middle of a sentence. Or, a nonsignificant sound, which out of several sounds, each of them significant, is capable of forming one significant sound- as amphi, peri, and the like. Or, a nonsignificant sound, which marks the beginning, end, or division of a sentence; such, however, that it cannot correctly stand by itself at the beginning of a sentence- as men, etoi, de.
A Noun is a composite significant sound, not marking time, of which no part is in itself significant: for in double or compound words we do not employ the separate parts as if each were in itself significant. Thus in Theodorus, 'god-given,' the doron or 'gift' is not in itself significant.
A Verb is a composite significant sound, marking time, in which, as in the noun, no part is in itself significant. For 'man' or 'white' does not express the idea of 'when'; but 'he walks' or 'he has walked' does connote time, present or past.
Inflection belongs both to the noun and verb, and expresses either the relation 'of,' 'to,' or the like; or that of number, whether one or many, as 'man' or 'men'; or the modes or tones in actual delivery, e.g., a question or a command. 'Did he go?' and 'go' are verbal inflections of this kind.
A Sentence or Phrase is a composite significant sound, some at least of whose parts are in themselves significant; for not every such group of words consists of verbs and nouns- 'the definition of man,' for example- but it may dispense even with the verb. Still it will always have some significant part, as 'in walking,' or 'Cleon son of Cleon.' A sentence or phrase may form a unity in two ways- either as signifying one thing, or as consisting of several parts linked together. Thus the Iliad is one by the linking together of parts, the definition of man by the unity of the thing signified.
Part XXI
Words are of two kinds, simple and double. By simple I mean those composed of nonsignificant elements, such as ge, 'earth.' By double or compound, those composed either of a significant and nonsignificant element (though within the whole word no element is significant), or of elements that are both significant. A word may likewise be triple, quadruple, or multiple in form, like so many Massilian expressions, e.g., 'Hermo-caico-xanthus [who prayed to Father Zeus].'
Every word is either current, or strange, or metaphorical, or ornamental, or newly-coined, or lengthened, or contracted, or altered.
By a current or proper word I mean one which is in general use among a people; by a strange word, one which is in use in another country. Plainly, therefore, the same word may be at once strange and current, but not in relation to the same people. The word sigynon, 'lance,' is to the Cyprians a current term but to us a strange one.
Metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion. Thus from genus to species, as: 'There lies my ship'; for lying at anchor is a species of lying. From species to genus, as: 'Verily ten thousand noble deeds hath Odysseus wrought'; for ten thousand is a species of large number, and is here used for a large number generally. From species to species, as: 'With blade of bronze drew away the life,' and 'Cleft the water with the vessel of unyielding bronze.' Here arusai, 'to draw away' is used for tamein, 'to cleave,' and tamein, again for arusai- each being a species of taking away. Analogy or proportion is when the second term is to the first as the fourth to the third. We may then use the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth. Sometimes too we qualify the metaphor by adding the term to which the proper word is relative. Thus the cup is to Dionysus as the shield to Ares. The cup may, therefore, be called 'the shield of Dionysus,' and the shield 'the cup of Ares.' Or, again, as old age is to life, so is evening to day. Evening may therefore be called, 'the old age of the day,' and old age, 'the evening of life,' or, in the phrase of Empedocles, 'life's setting sun.' For some of the terms of the proportion there is at times no word in existence; still the metaphor may be used. For instance, to scatter seed is called sowing: but the action of the sun in scattering his rays is nameless. Still this process bears to the sun the same relation as sowing to the seed. Hence the expression of the poet 'sowing the god-created light.' There is another way in which this kind of metaphor may be employed. We may apply an alien term, and then deny of that term one of its proper attributes; as if we were to call the shield, not 'the cup of Ares,' but 'the wineless cup'.
A newly-coined word is one which has never been even in local use, but is adopted by the poet himself. Some such words there appear to be: as ernyges, 'sprouters,' for kerata, 'horns'; and areter, 'supplicator', for hiereus, 'priest.'
A word is lengthened when its own vowel is exchanged for a longer one, or when a syllable is inserted. A word is contracted when some part of it is removed. Instances of lengthening are: poleos for poleos, Peleiadeo for Peleidou; of contraction: kri, do, and ops, as in mia ginetai amphoteron ops, 'the appearance of both is one.'
An altered word is one in which part of the ordinary form is left unchanged, and part is recast: as in dexiteron kata mazon, 'on the right breast,' dexiteron is for dexion.
Nouns in themselves are either masculine, feminine, or neuter. Masculine are such as end in N, R, S, or in some letter compounded with S- these being two, PS and X. Feminine, such as end in vowels that are always long, namely E and O, and- of vowels that admit of lengthening- those in A. Thus the number of letters in which nouns masculine and feminine end is the same; for PS and X are equivalent to endings in S. No noun ends in a mute or a vowel short by nature. Three only end in I- meli, 'honey'; kommi, 'gum'; peperi, 'pepper'; five end in U. Neuter nouns end in these two latter vowels; also in N and S.
The perfection of style is to be clear without being mean. The clearest style is that which uses only current or proper words; at the same time it is mean- witness the poetry of Cleophon and of Sthenelus. That diction, on the other hand, is lofty and raised above the commonplace which employs unusual words. By unusual, I mean strange (or rare) words, metaphorical, lengthened- anything, in short, that differs from the normal idiom. Yet a style wholly composed of such words is either a riddle or a jargon; a riddle, if it consists of metaphors; a jargon, if it consists of strange (or rare) words. For the essence of a riddle is to express true facts under impossible combinations. Now this cannot be done by any arrangement of ordinary words, but by the use of metaphor it can. Such is the riddle: 'A man I saw who on another man had glued the bronze by aid of fire,' and others of the same kind. A diction that is made up of strange (or rare) terms is a jargon. A certain infusion, therefore, of these elements is necessary to style; for the strange (or rare) word, the metaphorical, the ornamental, and the other kinds above mentioned, will raise it above the commonplace and mean, while the use of proper words will make it perspicuous. But nothing contributes more to produce a cleanness of diction that is remote from commonness than the lengthening, contraction, and alteration of words. For by deviating in exceptional cases from the normal idiom, the language will gain distinction; while, at the same time, the partial conformity with usage will give perspicuity. The critics, therefore, are in error who censure these licenses of speech, and hold the author up to ridicule. Thus Eucleides, the elder, declared that it would be an easy matter to be a poet if you might lengthen syllables at will. He caricatured the practice in the very form of his diction, as in the verse:
"Epicharen eidon Marathonade badizonta,
"I saw Epichares walking to Marathon, "
"ouk an g'eramenos ton ekeinou elleboron.
"Not if you desire his hellebore."
To employ such license at all obtrusively is, no doubt, grotesque; but in any mode of poetic diction there must be moderation. Even metaphors, strange (or rare) words, or any similar forms of speech, would produce the like effect if used without propriety and with the express purpose of being ludicrous. How great a difference is made by the appropriate use of lengthening, may be seen in Epic poetry by the insertion of ordinary forms in the verse. So, again, if we take a strange (or rare) word, a metaphor, or any similar mode of expression, and replace it by the current or proper term, the truth of our observation will be manifest. For example, Aeschylus and Euripides each composed the same iambic line. But the alteration of a single word by Euripides, who employed the rarer term instead of the ordinary one, makes one verse appear beautiful and the other trivial. Aeschylus in his Philoctetes says:
"phagedaina d'he mou sarkas esthiei podos.
"The tumor which is eating the flesh of my foot."
Euripides substitutes thoinatai, 'feasts on,' for esthiei, 'feeds on.' Again, in the line,
"nun de m'eon oligos te kai outidanos kai aeikes,
"Yet a small man, worthless and unseemly,"
the difference will be felt if we substitute the common words,
"nun de m'eon mikros te kai asthenikos kai aeides.
"Yet a little fellow, weak and ugly."
Or, if for the line,
"diphron aeikelion katatheis oligen te trapezan,
"Setting an unseemly couch and a meager table,"
we read,
"diphron mochtheron katatheis mikran te trapezan.
"Setting a wretched couch and a puny table."
Or, for eiones booosin, 'the sea shores roar,' eiones krazousin, 'the sea shores screech.'
Again, Ariphrades ridiculed the tragedians for using phrases which no one would employ in ordinary speech: for example, domaton apo, 'from the house away,' instead of apo domaton, 'away from the house;' sethen, ego de nin, 'to thee, and I to him;' Achilleos peri, 'Achilles about,' instead of peri Achilleos, 'about Achilles;' and the like. It is precisely because such phrases are not part of the current idiom that they give distinction to the style. This, however, he failed to see.
It is a great matter to observe propriety in these several modes of expression, as also in compound words, strange (or rare) words, and so forth. But the greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances.
Of the various kinds of words, the compound are best adapted to dithyrambs, rare words to heroic poetry, metaphors to iambic. In heroic poetry, indeed, all these varieties are serviceable. But in iambic verse, which reproduces, as far as may be, familiar speech, the most appropriate words are those which are found even in prose. These are the current or proper, the metaphorical, the ornamental.
Concerning Tragedy and imitation by means of action this may suffice.
Aristotle: From, Topics
Part 1
Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. First, then, we must say what reasoning is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us.
Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a) It is a 'demonstration', when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are 'generally accepted' which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers-i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again (c), reasoning is 'contentious' if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but are not really such, or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called 'reasoning' as well, but the other should be called 'contentious reasoning', but not 'reasoning', since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further (d), besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the mis-reasonings that start from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by every one or by the majority or by philosophers-that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them-but he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions which, though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his mis-reasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of reasoning. In general, in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which we shall discuss later, we may remark that that amount of distinction between them may serve, because it is not our purpose to give the exact definition of any of them; we merely want to describe them in outline; we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way.
Part 2
Next in order after the foregoing, we must say for how many and for what purposes the treatise is useful. They are three-intellectual training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences. That it is useful as a training is obvious on the face of it. The possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to argue about the subject proposed. For purposes of casual encounters, it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the ground not of other people's convictions but of their own, while we shift the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. For the study of the philosophical sciences it is useful, because the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. It has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.
Part 3
We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we are in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and medicine and faculties of that kind: this means the doing of that which we choose with the materials that are available. For it is not every method that the rhetorician will employ to persuade, or the doctor to heal; still, if he omits none of the available means, we shall say that his grasp of the science is adequate.
Part 4
First, then, we must see of what parts our inquiry consists. Now if we were to grasp (a) with reference to how many, and what kind of, things arguments take place, and with what materials they start, and (h) how we are to become well supplied with these, we should have sufficiently won our goal. Now the materials with which arguments start are equal in number, and are identical, with the subjects on which reasonings take place. For arguments start with 'propositions', while the subjects on which reasonings take place are 'problems'. Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident-for the differentia too, applying as it does to a class (or genus), should be ranked together with the genus. Since, however, of what is peculiar to anything part signifies its essence, while part does not, let us divide the 'peculiar' into both the aforesaid parts, and call that part which indicates the essence a 'definition', while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology which is generally current about these things, and speak of it as a 'property'. What we have said, then, makes it clear that according to our present division, the elements turn out to be four, all told, namely either property or definition or genus or accident. Do not let any one suppose us to mean that each of these enunciated by itself constitutes a proposition or problem, but only that it is from these that both problems and propositions are formed. The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. For if it be put in this way, "'An animal that walks on two feet" is the definition of man, is it not?' or '"Animal" is the genus of man, is it not?' the result is a proposition: but if thus, 'Is "an animal that walks on two feet" a definition of man or no?' [or 'Is "animal" his genus or no?'] the result is a problem. Similarly too in other cases. Naturally, then, problems and propositions are equal in number: for out of every proposition you will make a problem if you change the turn of the phrase.
Part 5
We must now say what are 'definition', 'property', 'genus', and 'accident'. A 'definition' is a phrase signifying a thing's essence. It is rendered in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a term, or of a phrase in lieu of another phrase; for it is sometimes possible to define the meaning of a phrase as well. People whose rendering consists of a term only, try it as they may, clearly do not render the definition of the thing in question, because a definition is always a phrase of a certain kind. One may, however, use the word 'definitory' also of such a remark as 'The "becoming" is "beautiful"', and likewise also of the question, 'Are sensation and knowledge the same or different?', for argument about definitions is mostly concerned with questions of sameness and difference. In a word we may call 'definitory' everything that falls under the same branch of inquiry as definitions; and that all the above-mentioned examples are of this character is clear on the face of them. For if we are able to argue that two things are the same or are different, we shall be well supplied by the same turn of argument with lines of attack upon their definitions as well: for when we have shown that they are not the same we shall have demolished the definition. Observe, please, that the converse of this last statement does not hold: for to show that they are the same is not enough to establish a definition. To show, however, that they are not the same is enough of itself to overthrow it.
A 'property' is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a property of man to-be-capable of learning grammar: for if A be a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if he be capable of learning grammar, he is a man. For no one calls anything a 'property' which may possibly belong to something else, e.g. 'sleep' in the case of man, even though at a certain time it may happen to belong to him alone. That is to say, if any such thing were actually to be called a property, it will be called not a 'property' absolutely, but a 'temporary' or a 'relative' property: for 'being on the right hand side' is a temporary property, while 'two-footed' is in point of fact ascribed as a property in certain relations; e.g. it is a property of man relatively to a horse and a dog. That nothing which may belong to anything else than A is a convertible predicate of A is clear: for it does not necessarily follow that if something is asleep it is a man.
A 'genus' is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. We should treat as predicates in the category of essence all such things as it would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question, 'What is the object before you?'; as, for example, in the case of man, if asked that question, it is appropriate to say 'He is an animal'. The question, 'Is one thing in the same genus as another or in a different one?' is also a 'generic' question; for a question of that kind as well falls under the same branch of inquiry as the genus: for having argued that 'animal' is the genus of man, and likewise also of ox, we shall have argued that they are in the same genus; whereas if we show that it is the genus of the one but not of the other, we shall have argued that these things are not in the same genus.
An 'accident' is (i) something which, though it is none of the foregoing-i.e. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus yet belongs to the thing: (something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) the 'sitting posture' may belong or not belong to some self-same thing. Likewise also 'whiteness', for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white, and at another not white. Of the definitions of accident the second is the better: for if he adopts the first, any one is bound, if he is to understand it, to know already what 'definition' and 'genus' and 'property' are, whereas the second is sufficient of itself to tell us the essential meaning of the term in question. To Accident are to be attached also all comparisons of things together, when expressed in language that is drawn in any kind of way from what happens (accidit) to be true of them; such as, for example, the question, 'Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?' and 'Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?', and any other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these. For in all such cases the question is 'to which of the two does the predicate in question happen (accidit) to belong more closely?' It is clear on the face of it that there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming a temporary or relative property. Thus the sitting posture is an accident, but will be a temporary property, whenever a man is the only person sitting, while if he be not the only one sitting, it is still a property relatively to those who are not sitting. So then, there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming both a relative and a temporary property; but a property absolutely it will never be.